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Abstract
Managerial bonus schemes and their effects on firm strategies and mar-
ket outcomes are extensively discussed in the literature. Though quota
bonuses are not uncommon in practice, they have not been analysed so far.
In this article we compare quota bonuses to profit-based evaluation and
sales (quantity) bonuses. In a duopoly setting with independent demand
shocks we find that under certain circumstances choosing quota bonuses
is a dominant strategy. This may explain the widespread use of quota
bonuses in situations where incentive problems are relevant.
1 Introduction
One of the most often used assumption of economic theory is that the goal of
the firm is profit-maximization. However, as Vickers (1985) indicates while the
separation of ownership and management leads to richer strategic opportunities
the incentives of the owner and the manager may not be compatible with each
other. When the objective of the owner and the manager is different, intended
profit-maximization might not lead to actual profit-maximization. To overcome
this problem owners often choose bonus systems to align incentives.
The existing literature on managerial bonuses and compensation, following
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) besides Vickers (1985) focuses
mainly on compensation schemes that are linear in some observable measure
(e.g. profits, revenue, relative profits, market share) linked to managerial deci-
sions.1 Yet, non-linear bonuses, such as the sales quota, when the agent receives
a lump-sum bonus if sales exceed a prescribed target, are often used in corporate
practice. For example, according to the empirical study of Joseph and Kalwani
(1998), only 5 percent of the companies participating in the survey paid a fixed
salary for their salespersons and 24 percent of them paid a commission over the
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fixed salary, whilst the majority of the companies offered a compensation pack-
age to the salespersons which included the possibility of some kind of bonus.
The firms answering the survey indicated the comparison of actual sales and
predetermined quotas as the most important factor influencing bonuses. Fur-
thermore, Murphy (2001) points out it is not uncommon for managers either to
receive some kind of lump-sum bonus if they achieve a certain target. Similarly,
Oyer (1998) remarks that contracts of top managers often include quota-like
clauses. The author also claims that a potential dynamic problem might arise
in this situation, since agents may exert higher effort when the date of bonus
determination is close, which can lead to uneven level of effort during the bonus
period. Thus top managers or salespersons can behave in an opportunistic way
when facing a quota-like compensation scheme. They can participate in ”timing
games”, i.e. they can speed up the signing of contracts or use creative account-
ing methods to ensure they obtain the bonus for fulfilling the quota. However,
the results of the analysis of individual level sales data by Steenburgh (2008)
seems to indicate that such ”timing games” rarely if ever happen, and the main
effect of applying quotas is an increase in the salespersons’ efforts.
The above results already hint at the fact that quotas influence the decision-
maker in a peculiar way. Healy (1985) emphasises that when the bonus system
includes an upper limit, managers have lower incentives to report revenue above
this limit. Leventis (1997) analyzed the behavior of New York surgeons, finding
that when they approach the penalty limit for malpractice, they are more prone
to choose low-risk procedures. Among Navy recruiters Asch (1990) found that
their efforts increased before the date of evaluations, and decreased following
that.
In spite of their practical relevance, to our knowledge quotas are not yet
formally analyzed in the literature of managerial bonuses.2 In this article we
present a formal model of quota bonuses compatible with the previous empirical
findings. We analyze the problem of quota bonuses in an oligopoly setting with
demand shocks. The model intends to grasp the ’locality’ of quotas as seen in
the above empirical examples: the closer an agent is to the prescribed quota,
the stronger its influence is going to be on their behavior. Our results indicate
that choosing quota bonuses can indeed be a dominant strategy.
2 The model
The model builds on a Cournot duopoly.3 The owners of both firms aim to
maximize their respective profits, while the managers making the operative
decisions aim to maximize their respective incomes. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that firms have no costs.
Products are homogeneous and following Jansen et al. (2007) we assume the
2Non-linear compensation systems are hardly ever discussed in the literature. For a very
specific discussion on piecewise-linear incentive systems see Chen and Miller (2009).
3The differences between Cournot and Bertrand competition regarding managerial bonuses
is discussed in Sklivas (1987) and Jansen et al. (2007).
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normalized inverse demand function to be P = 1−Q, where P is the price and
Q is the industry output. We further assume that there is some uncertainty
about the sales that take place within a given period. This could be due to
unintended timing problems, such as delays in contracting or orders arriving in
the last minute. This quantity shock is from normal distribution with a mean of
0 and a variance of σ2. The firms’ respective shocks are independent. Therefore
if the manager of firm i decides to sell qi units, and that of firm j decides to
sell qj units, then the actual sales within the period are qi + εi and qj + εj
respectively, where εi ∼ N(0, σ2), εj ∼ N(0, σ2) and Cov(εi, εj) = 0.
We assume that the owners, as well as the managers, are risk neutral.4 In
section 4 we discuss the possible implications of alternate attitudes to risk.
We posit three possible compensation schemes.
i) Evaluation based exclusively on profit: in this case the variable part of the
manager’s income is proportional to the profit of the firm: rpii, where r is
the profit share of the manager. According to this, the manager of firm i
maximizes the following expression:
E[(1− (qi + εi)− (qj + εj))(qi + εi)] = (1− qi − qj)qi − σ2 (1)
ii) Sales bonus: in this case the variable part of the manager’s income depends
on the profit of the firm, but also on the quantity sold: ripii + biqi, where
qi is the amount sold by firm i and bi is the per unit sales bonus offered by
firm i. Thus the manager of firm i maximizes the following expression:
E[(1−(qi+εi)−(qj+εj))(qi+εi)+λi(qi+εi)] = (1−qi−qj)qi−σ2+λiqi, (2)
where λi ≡ bri is a coefficent of the bonus scheme (more precisely it is
the ratio of the per unit sales bonus and the profit share of the manager)
determined by the owner of firm i.
iii) Quota bonus: in this case the variable part of the manager’s income depends
on the profit of the firm, but the manager also receives a fixed amount if
the sales quota is met: ripii + Qi, if qi ≥ q¯ and ripii otherwise, where q¯ is
the sales quota set by the owner. Accordingly, the manager maximizes:
E[(1− (qi + εi)− (qj + εj))(qi + εi) + λiP [(qi + εi) ≥ q¯)] =
= (1− qi − qj)qi − σ2 + λ
(
1
2
+
1√
pi
∫ qi−q¯
σ
√
2
0
e−t
2
dt
)
, (3)
where λi ≡ Qiri is a bonus coefficient determined by the owner of firm i,
furthermore P [(qi + εi) ≥ q¯] is the probability that actual sales meet or
exceed the quota, given that the manager planned to sell qi units.
4Similarly to Fershtman and Judd (1987).
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We assume – in line with the previous literature – that the owners maximize
their gross profit, i.e. their profit before paying managerial compensation. On
the other hand we assume that if two methods lead to the same level of gross
profit, the owner will prefer the one with lower cost of compensation. These as-
sumptions asymptotically lead to the same result as actual profit maximization,
if the magnitude of compensation payments is significantly smaller than that of
the firm’s profit.
We posit the following game. In period 0 the owners announce the profit
share ri and hire the manager.
5 In period 1 – if necessary – owners choose the
amount and conditions of the bonus. In period 2 managers choose the planned
output of their firms, shocks are realized, actual outputs are determined and
the market clears.
3 Results
3.1 Cases without quotas
The following results are well-known. We present them in order to compare
them to later results.
Lemma 1. If both owners base their evaluation exclusively on profit, a classical
Cournot duopoly is formed in the 2 period, thus the expected outputs and profits
are respectively
q1 = q2 =
1
3
and
pi1 = pi2 =
1
9
Lemma 2. If the owner of firm 1 bases their evaluation exclusively based on
profit, while the owner of firm 2 introduces a sales bonus, then in period 2 we get
an outcome equivalent to a Stackelberg duopoly6. The respective outputs, profits
and bonuses are
q1 =
1
4
, q2 =
1
2
and
pi1 =
1
16
, pi2 =
1
8
5Notice that because of uncertainty and symmetry in equilibrium all firms offer the same
profit share.
6Similarly to the result of Basu (1995).
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while
λ2 =
1
4
Lemma 3. If both owners introduces a sales bonus, then the respective outputs,
profits and bonus coefficients are7
q1 = q2 =
2
5
pi1 = pi2 =
2
25
and
λ1 = λ2 =
1
5
3.2 Exclusively profit-based evaluation versus quota bonus
Let us consider the case when the owner of firm 1 bases their evaluation exclu-
sively on profit while the owner of firm 2 pays quota bonus.
Since the owner of firm 1 does not make any strategic decisions in period
1, we can presume that similarly to the case of sales bonus8, the owner of firm
2 can set such incentives in period 1 that commit the manager to produce the
Stackelberg leader output.
If the manager of firm 1 maximizes the expected profit of the firm, i.e. the
following equation9
S(q1) = q1(1− q1 − q2), (4)
then they choose quantities according to the following first-order condition
∂S(q1)
∂q1
= 1− 2q1 − q2 = 0. (5)
The manager of firm 2 maximizes the following expression:
S(q2) = q2(1− q1 − q2) + λ2
(
1
2
+
1√
pi
∫ q2−q¯√
2σ
0
e−t
2
dt
)
(6)
thus chooses quantities according to the following first-order condition
∂S(q2)
∂q2
= 1− q1 − 2q2 + λ2 e
− (q¯−q2)2
2σ2√
2piσ
= 0. (7)
7See eg. Vickers (1985)
8As well as the case of the market share bonus (see Jansen et al. (2007)) or that of the
bonus based on relative profit (see Miller and Pazgal (2002)).
9Hereafter we leave out the terms including the variance, since they do not affect the
first-order conditions.
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If we would solve the system of equations comprising equations (5) and (7),
we could obtain the expected outputs and then calculate the expected profits.
This is, however, not a trivial task. Thus we will first assume the incentives
applied by the owner of firm 2 and then check whether they were optimal.
It can be easily shown that if the owner of firm 2 introduces the system of
incentives below
q¯ =
1
2
(8)
λ2 =
σ
2
√
pi
2
(9)
then the respective outputs are:
q1 =
1
4
and q2 =
1
2
(10)
Since these are the output levels of a Stackelberg duopoly, we can give the
respective profits, which are
pi1 =
1
16
and pi2 =
1
8
(11)
and furthermore we have shown that they are truly optimal.
Proposition 1. If the owner of the other firm evaluates exclusively based on
profits, then sales bonus and quota bonus leads to the same outcome. However,
since:
qs · λs = 1
2
· 1
4
>
1
2
· σ
2
√
pi
2
= P [(qq + εq) ≥ q¯)]λq
in the case of sufficiently low σs (σ < σ∗ ≈ 0.398942) the cost of quota bonus
will be lower.
3.3 Sales bonus versus quota bonus
Let us investigate the case when the owner of firm 1 introduces a sales bonus,
while that of firm 2 introduces a quota bonus.
The manager of firm 1 maximizes the following function
S(q1) = q1(1− q1 − q2) + λ1q1, (12)
thus chooses quantity according to the following first-order condition
∂S(q1)
∂q1
= 1− 2q1 − q2 + λ1 = 0. (13)
The manager of firm 2 maximizes the following expression
6
S(q2) = q2(1− q1 − q2) + λ2
(
1
2
+
1√
pi
∫ q2−q¯
σ
√
2
0
e−t
2
dt
)
(14)
thus chooses quantity according to the following first-order condition
∂S(q2)
∂q2
= 1− q1 − 2q2 + λ2 e
− (q¯−q2)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
= 0. (15)
It is easy to see that the best-response function of the manager of firm 2
cannot be expressed in a closed form. However, under certain conditions we can
invoke the implicit function theorem.
The theorem can be used if the Jacobi matrix of the partial derivatives is
not zero in an environment of the solution, i.e.10
|J | =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂F1q1 ∂F1q2∂F2q1 ∂F2q2
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−2 −1
−1 −2− λ2 e
− (q2−q¯)
2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
q2−q¯
σ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 6= 0 (16)
The relevant first-order condition for the owner of firm 1 is
∂Π1
∂λ1
= (1− 2q1 − q2) ∂q1
∂λ1
− q1 ∂q2
∂λ1
= 0 (17)
while for the owner of firm 2 that is
∂Π2
∂λ2
= (1− q1 − 2q2) ∂q2
∂λ2
− q2 ∂q1
∂λ2
= 0 (18)
Assuming that the (16) condition holds, we can find the partial derivatives
with the help os the implicit function theorem.
∂q1
λ1
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂F1λ1 ∂F1q2∂F2λ1 ∂F2q2
∣∣∣∣∣
|J | =
λ2
e
− (q2−q¯)
2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
q2−q¯
σ2 − 2
|J | (19)
∂q2
λ1
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂F1q1 ∂F1λ1∂F2q1 ∂F2λ1
∣∣∣∣∣
|J | =
1
|J | (20)
∂q1
λ2
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂F1λ2 ∂F1q2∂F2λ2 ∂F2q2
∣∣∣∣∣
|J | =
e
− (q¯−q2)
2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
|J | (21)
∂q2
λ2
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂F1q1 ∂F1λ2∂F2q1 ∂F2λ2
∣∣∣∣∣
|J | =
−2 e−
(q2−q¯)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
|J | (22)
10Hereon we refer to the left hand sides of equations (13) and (15) as F1 and F2 respectively.
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Substituting the partial derivatives into equations (17) and (18), we get the
following equations after simplification
∂Π1
∂λ1
= 3q1 + 2q2 − 2 + (1− 2q1 + q2)λ2 e
− (q2−q¯)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
q¯ − q2
σ2
= 0 (23)
∂Π2
∂λ2
= 2q1 + 3q2 − 2 = 0 (24)
Notice, however, that from equation (15):
λ2
e−
(q2−q¯)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
= q1 + 2q2 − 1 (25)
thus we can express the first-order condition for the owner of firm 1 in the
following way
∂Π1
∂λ1
= 3q1 + 2q2 − 2 + (1− 2q1 + q2)(q1 + 2q2 − 1) q¯ − q2
σ2
= 0 (26)
Let k stand for the expression q¯−q2σ2 ! The optimal k cannot be negative, since
in this case choosing −k would present the same incentives for the manager but
the expected cost of the bonus system would be lower.
Let us assume first that k is pozitive! Solving (24) and (26) as a system of
equations leads to the following result11
q1 =
5k − 3
(
5−√25− (6− k)k)
8k
(27)
q2 =
5 + k −√25− (6− k)k
4k
(28)
Thus the owner of firm 2 maximizes the expression
(
5+k−
√
25−(6−k)k
)2
32k2 .
However, the derivative of the above expression is negative for all positive values
of k, thus the optimal value of k is zero. Hence
q1 = q2 =
2
5
(29)
so
q¯ =
2
5
(30)
From this we have that
λ1 =
1
5
and λ2 =
σ
5
√
2pi (31)
11We excluded potential solutions of the system of equations that would lead to negative
output and/or negative bonus.
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Proposition 2. If the other firm introduces a sales bonus, then a sales bonus
or a quota bonus leads to the same outcome. However, since
qs · λs = 2
5
· 1
5
=
2
25
>
1
2
· σ
5
√
2pi = P [(qq + εq) ≥ q¯)] · λq
if σ is sufficiently low (σ < σ∗ ≈ 0.319154), the expected cost of the quota bonus
is lower for the owner of firm 2.
3.4 Both firms use quota bonus
Finally we discuss the case when both owners introduces a quota bonus.
The manager of firm 1 maximizes the expression below
S(q1) = q1(1− q1 − q2) + λ1
(
1
2
+
1√
pi
∫ q1−q¯1
σ
√
2
0
e−t
2
dt
)
(32)
thus chooses quantity according to the following first-order condition
∂S(q1)
∂q1
= 1− 2q1 − q2 + λ1 e
− (q¯1−q1)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
= 0. (33)
The manager of firm 2 maximizes the following expression
S(q2) = q2(1− q1 − q2) + λ2
(
1
2
+
1√
pi
∫ q2−q¯2
σ
√
2
0
e−t
2
dt
)
(34)
thus chooses quantity according to the following first-order condition
∂S(q2)
∂q2
= 1− q1 − 2q2 + λ2 e
− (q¯2−q2)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
= 0. (35)
Applying the implicit function theorem we get the following12
∂q1
λ1
=
e−
(q¯1−q1)2+(q¯2−q2)2
2σ2 (λ2(q¯2 − q2)− 2e
(q¯2−q2)2
2σ2
√
2piσ3)
2piσ4
(36)
∂q2
λ1
=
e−
(q¯1−q1)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
(37)
∂q1
λ2
=
e−
(q¯2−q2)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
(38)
∂q2
λ2
=
e−
(q¯2−q2)2+(q¯1−q1)2
2σ2 (λ1(q¯1 − q1)− 2e
(q¯1−q1)2
2σ2
√
2piσ3)
2piσ4
(39)
12For simplicity, we do not use the actual value of the partial derivatives, but we multiply
them by |J |
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Using the partial derivatives we get to the following first-order conditions
after some simplification
∂Π1
∂λ1
= λ2(2q1 + q2 − 1)(q2 − q¯2) + e
(q¯2−q2)2
2σ2
√
2pi(3q1 + 2q2 − 2)σ3 = 0 (40)
∂Π2
∂λ2
= λ1(2q2 + q1 − 1)(q1 − q¯1) + e
(q¯1−q1)2
2σ2
√
2pi(3q2 + 2q1 − 2)σ3 = 0 (41)
In the next step we can obtain from equations (33) and (35) that
λ1 =
√
2piσ(2q1 + q2 − 1)e
(q¯1−q1)2
2σ2 (42)
λ2 =
√
2piσ(q1 + 2q2 − 1)e
(q¯2−q2)2
2σ2 (43)
Using these equations we can rewrite the first-order conditions as
∂Π1
∂λ1
= (1− q1 − 2q2)(2q1 + q2 − 1) q¯2 − q2
σ2
+ (3q1 + 2q2 − 2) = 0 (44)
∂Π2
∂λ2
= (1− 2q1 − q2)(2q2 + q1 − 1) q¯1 − q1
σ2
+ (3q2 + 2q1 − 2) = 0 (45)
Let us denote the expression q¯1−q1σ2 by k1, and the expression
q¯2−q2
σ2 by k2.
Notice first that if firm i (i = 1, 2) chooses zero for ki, than we get back to the
first-order conditions of the case discussed in section 3.3, and the best response
of the other firm is to choose zero for k−i. Limiting the set of possible solutions
to symmetric strategy profiles, it is easy to see that if both firms would choose
a positive value for k, than the respective outputs would exceed 25 , thus the
strategy profile where k1 = k2 = 0 is payoff-dominant.
Thus
q1 = q2 =
2
5
q¯1 = q¯2 =
2
5
and
λ1 = λ2 =
σ
5
√
2pi
From this we can state the following:
Proposition 3. If the other firm introduces a quota bonus, than the sales bonus
and the quota bonus leads to the same outcome. However, since
qs · λs = 2
5
· 1
5
=
2
25
>
1
2
· σ
5
√
2pi = P [(qq + εq) ≥ q¯)] · λq
if σ is sufficiently low (σ < σ∗ ≈ 0.319154), the expected cost of the quota bonus
is lower for the owner of firm 2.
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4 Conclusion
We have seen that the quota bonus leads to the same outcomes as the sales
bonus, however, its expected cost is lower. We can draw the conclusion that
assuming risk-neutral actors quota bonus is preferred to sales bonus. This,
however, might not hold for all risk attitudes. The role of risk tolerance was
also emphasized by Ross (1991) who claims that the behavior of agents influences
the process of quota determination. In fact, quotas under uncertainty can be
seen as gambles. The very same incentives could have different effects on agents
with different risk attitudes. Thus in the case of risk-averse actors the cost
advantages of the quota bonus indicated by our model can diminish or vanish.
This can explain the fact that some firms use sales bonuses, while other firms
use quota bonuses. Firms with less risk-averse actors use quota bonuses, while
firms with more risk-averse actors offer quota bonuses.
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